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https://git.huckle.dev/Huckles-Minecraft-Archive/LCE-Revelations.git
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ba3ebe666c
Comprehensive security system to protect against packet-sniffing attacks, XUID harvesting, privilege escalation, bot flooding, and XUID impersonation. - Stream cipher: per-session XOR cipher with 4-message handshake via CustomPayloadPacket (MC|CKey, MC|CAck, MC|COn). Negotiated per-connection, backwards compatible (old clients/servers fall back to plaintext). - Security gate: buffers all game data until cipher handshake completes, preventing unsecured clients from receiving any XUIDs or game state. - Cipher handshake enforcer: kicks clients that don't complete the handshake within 5 seconds (configurable via require-secure-client). - Identity tokens: persistent per-XUID tokens in identity-tokens.json, issued over the encrypted channel, verified on reconnect. Prevents XUID replay attacks. Client stores server-specific tokens. - PROXY protocol v1: parses real client IPs from playit.gg tunnel headers so rate limiting, IP bans, and XUID spoof detection work per-player. - Rate limiting: per-IP sliding window (default 5 connections/30s) with pending connection cap (default 10). - Privilege hardening: OP requires ops.json, live checks on every command and privilege packet. Host-only server settings changes. - XUID stripping: PreLoginPacket response sends INVALID_XUID placeholders. - Packet validation: readUtf global string cap, reduced max packet size, stream desync protection on oversized strings. - OpManager: persistent ops.json with XUID-based OP list. - Whitelist improvements: whitelist add accepts player names with ambiguity detection, XUID cache from login attempts. - revoketoken command: revoke identity tokens for players who lost theirs. - server.log: persistent log file written alongside console output with flush-per-write to survive crashes. - CLI security logging: consolidated per-join security summary with cipher status, token status, XUID, and real IP. Security warnings for kicks, spoofing, and unauthorized commands.
64 lines
1.7 KiB
C++
64 lines
1.7 KiB
C++
#pragma once
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#include <string>
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#include <unordered_map>
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#include <vector>
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#include <cstdint>
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#ifdef _WINDOWS64
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#include <Windows.h>
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#endif
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typedef unsigned __int64 PlayerUID;
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namespace ServerRuntime
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{
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namespace Security
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{
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/**
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* Persistent XUID-to-token binding for identity verification.
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*
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* On first login, the server issues a random 32-byte token to the client
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* over the encrypted cipher channel. The client stores it locally.
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* On subsequent logins, the server challenges the client to present
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* its stored token. Mismatch = kicked.
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*
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* This prevents XUID replay attacks: an attacker who steals a XUID
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* still needs the token, which was only sent over the encrypted channel.
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*
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* Tokens are stored in `identity-tokens.json` and persist across restarts.
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*/
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class IdentityTokenManager
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{
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public:
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static const int TOKEN_SIZE = 32;
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IdentityTokenManager();
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~IdentityTokenManager();
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IdentityTokenManager(const IdentityTokenManager &) = delete;
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IdentityTokenManager &operator=(const IdentityTokenManager &) = delete;
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bool Initialize(const std::string &filePath);
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void Shutdown();
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bool HasToken(PlayerUID xuid) const;
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bool GetToken(PlayerUID xuid, uint8_t outToken[TOKEN_SIZE]) const;
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bool IssueToken(PlayerUID xuid, uint8_t outToken[TOKEN_SIZE]);
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bool VerifyToken(PlayerUID xuid, const uint8_t token[TOKEN_SIZE]) const;
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bool RevokeToken(PlayerUID xuid);
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private:
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bool Load();
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bool Save() const;
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std::string m_filePath;
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std::unordered_map<PlayerUID, std::vector<uint8_t>> m_tokens;
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mutable CRITICAL_SECTION m_lock;
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bool m_initialized;
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};
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IdentityTokenManager &GetIdentityTokenManager();
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}
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}
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